Knowledge and the Moral Dimension in the Firm by José Castro Caldas et al.
Knowledge and the Moral Dimension in the Firm 
 
José Castro Caldas*, Helena Lopes*, Nuno Teles** 
 
*Economics Department of ISCTE and DINÂMIA, Lisbon 
** DINÂMIA, Lisbon 
 
Paper prepared for the DIME Workshop “Motivations and Incentives: creating and 
organizing knowledge in organisational contexts”, Lisboa, March 30-31 
 
Abstract: Work within firms is in a sense always a cooperative venture thus involving a social 
dilemma. This paper addresses the following related questions: 
1.  How is the problem of aligning the motivations and actions of the agents with the goals 
of the organization solved within firms? 
2.  Which institutional mechanisms within the firm may foster its capability to mobilize 
knowledge and creativity? 
The first question is an old one and has been a central focus of the economics’ theories of the 
firm. The second question emerges as a crucial challenge in the knowledge-based economy.  
The main theoretical accounts of the firm can be interpreted in the light of the three principles- 
separation, command and association – that are present in all social theoretical accounts of the 
problem of order. In the seminal works of Coase (1937) and Alchian and Demsetz (1972), 
through Transaction Cost, Agency and New Property Rights theories two of these principles are 
always evoked to solve the problem of the alignment of the motivations and actions of the 
agents with the goals of the organization. 
Concerning separation, mainstream economics has devoted the best of its efforts to prove that 
order could emerge of the separate free choices of individuals. In every description of the firm 
as a nexus of contracts as agency or property rights theory, the firm is described as a set of 
separate individuals interacting in a market-like way. 
Command is the principle of order called for when separation breaks down. Command comes in 
different forms: as the outcome of a contract or as the outcome of a power differential. In some 
of the new institutional theories of the firm the bottom line is command, but the efficacy of 
command requires that people obey. Assuming obedience at the outset as the counterpart of 
command, as transaction cost and new property rights do, is highly unsatisfactory. 
A third principle of order, until recently excluded or minimized in economics, association, is 
required. Association is voluntary action of individuals towards a common goal. The condition 
for its robustness would be a capacity for commitment without limits - a moral imperative of 
some sort. But since such a capacity is admittedly too demanding, commitment tends to be 
conceived as bounded by the weakness of the will, and conditional on the behavior of others, 
giving rise to a behavioral pattern that is usually described as reciprocity. It is morality that may 
explain the commitment and trust needed for consent, as it is consent that may account for the 
effectiveness of the command.  
Any order involves a combination of the three principles referred above. The changes in 
institutions and technologies presently under way call for a transformation of the specific 
combination that historically prevailed within most firms in the 20
th century. We conclude by 
conjecturing that in a time when work is characterized by a high intensity of knowledge, the 
governance rationale of firms should be grounded on elements of separation with elements of 
association with the element of command reduced to what Barnard (1938) called authority. 
 
  11. Introduction 
 
The growing importance of knowledge as a key factor of competitive advantage 
has been transforming the understanding of the nature of firms in economics. 
While in the past they were simply viewed as loci of co-ordination where 
exogenous knowledge is mobilised, currently, firms are conceived as well as 
arenas for the advancement of knowledge for creativity and innovation. 
Economics’ account of firms has thus become richer and more accurate. 
Nevertheless, in surveying the most influential accounts of the firm in 
economics, it appears that in general, and in particular in those that explicitly 
deal with knowledge, a satisfactory explanation is still missing on why and how 
the problem of aligning the motivations and actions of the agents with the goals 
of the organization
1is overcome. Production, even within firms, is in a sense 
always a cooperative venture. Given all that is known on the social dilemmatic 
nature of cooperation, how is the problem solved within firms? What is the 
cement of the firm? 
To the extent that the IA-OG problem tends to become more salient at a time 
where the knowledge, learning potential and creativity of employers and 
employees have become major assets, this deficiency has become a major 
theoretical shortcoming. Which institutional mechanisms within the firm may 
foster its capability to mobilize the knowledge and creativity of the individuals 
involved in the production process? Which forms of economic organisation are 
more appropriate to enhance creativity and the sharing of knowledge?     
In trying to address those questions the next section of this paper briefly 
analyses Coase’s and Alchian and Demsetz’s seminal works in order to identify 
the terms in which the IA-OG issue was first raised. In the third section, the 
most influential theories of the firm in the New Institutionalist Economic tradition 
are surveyed, with a focus on the solution they advance to the IA-OG problem. 
The knowledge based theories of the firm are addressed in the same 
perspective in section four. In section five the different principles conceived to 
address the problem of order – separation, command and association - and 
                                                           
1 A problem we henceforth will refer to as the individual action – organizational goals problem, 
or simply the IA-OG problem. 
  2their application to the firm are presented. Section six highlights the limitations 
of the pure principles in accounting for creativity and the sharing of knowledge. 
Drawing on those limitations we conclude by conjecturing that the type of 
impurity that is called for in respect to creativity and knowledge has to be a a 
complementary combination of principles.  
 
2. The IA-OG problem: setting the stage         
 
For Adam Smith the division of labour, which was the key to the wealth of 
nations, could be achieved either in the market or within the pin factory. 
Although Smith favoured the market over command, no account was given on 
why the pin factory existed at all. Almost two centuries later, the absence of a 
satisfactory understanding of the firm was to be perceived as a major deficiency 
of economics. As pointed out by Coase (1937) in his seminal paper, for a 
theoretical account which depicted the “normal economic system” as one that 
“works itself” in the absence of any type of central control, the existence of firms 
had to be considered indeed as an abnormal fact.   
 
Coase’s blindspot 
Coase’s theory and those that followed were all attempts to overcome that 
deficiency of “economic theory”. However, none has led to the emergence of a 
common understanding of firms, and seventy years after Coase’s paper “there 
is still no unified theory of the firm” (Garrouste and Saussier, 2005).  
In all New Institutionalist approaches Coase’s question – why is there any 
organization? – is always the starting point.  His well known answer was that 
organization - the firm - economized on “the costs of using the price 
mechanism” (Coase, 1937: ?) by substituting a series of contracts along time by 
one – the labour contract.  
Coase clearly understood the nature of the labour contract as one in which one 
party “agrees to obey the directions of […another…] within certain limits” 
(Coase, 1937: ?), and which involves a set of rights and obligations that are 
  3substantively and normatively different from those of a pure market transaction 
of commodities:  
“(1) The servant must be under the duty of rendering personal services to the master or 
to others on behalf of the master, otherwise the contract is a contract for sale of goods 
or the like. 
(2) The master must have the right to control the servant’s work (…) It is this right of 
control and interference (…) which is the dominant characteristic in this relation and 
marks off the servant from an independent contractor (…). 
We thus see that it is the fact of direction which is the essence of the legal concept of 
“employer and employee” (Coase, 1937:13-14; emphasis added). 
But while rightly pointing to the centrality of the dependency/obedience issue, 
he assumed obedience of the employee and compliance with the normative 
constraints of the employer as inherent in the legal dimension of the labour 
contract and so he took them for granted
2.  The IA-OG problem was thus 
"solved" by Coase with the assumption of obedience of the employee and 
compliance with the normative constraints of the employer.  
 
Teamwork 
More than three decades later, Alchian and Demsetz (1972) took up once again 
Coase’s question – why is there any organization? – advancing this time a more 
convincing answer to the IA-OG problem. Their explanation for the existence of 
capitalist firms was clearly stated: (a) “resource owners increase productivity 
through cooperative specialization” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 777); (b) gains 
from specialization can be obtained either within an organization like the firm, or 
across markets; (c) an “economic organization”, be it the market or the firm, will 
be efficient to the extent that it will apportion “rewards in accord with 
productivity”  (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 778); (d)  team production, that is, 
production that uses several resources, owned by different people, may yield an 
output that is larger than the sum of separable outputs; (d)  in face of team 
production any decentralized market mechanism will fail in aligning productivity 
and rewards due to “metering problems”, that is, the difficulty in measuring 
individual productivity and apportioning proportional rewards; (e) if “there is a 
  4net increase in productivity available by team production, net of metering cost 
(…), then team production will be relied upon rather than a multitude of bilateral 
exchange of separable individual outputs” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 780); 
but (f) the efficient solution of the metering problem in team production requires 
a “centralized contractual agent” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 778). 
In this account “resource owners” are caught in a social dilemma – a collective 
action problem. They all recognize the advantage of team work but since in 
“team production, marginal products of cooperative team members are not so 
directly and separably (i.e. cheaply) observable” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 
780), the alignment of rewards and input contribution cannot be taken for 
granted
3, and, in the absence of such an alignment, they all have an incentive 
to shirk on their productive efforts. The incentive to shirk would be absent if 
there would be a cost to shirking. However, such a cost could not be imposed 
on each other in a decentralized way. Given that metering, monitoring and 
punishing is costly, a second order collective action problem would arise since 
every “owner of resourses” would have once again an incentive for shirking in 
those tasks. Market competition from potential team members could be 
considered as another decentralized mechanism that might align productivity 
and rewards. However, even if new challengers for team membership could 
secure a place in the team by accepting a smaller portion of rewards or 
promising to produce more, they would subsequently have an incentive to shirk 
as great as the incentives of the inputs replaced.   
While decentralized methods would fail, a centralized one might work: “One 
method of reducing shirking is for someone to specialize as a monitor to check 
the input performance of team members” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 781). 
However, as pointed by the authors, this will immediately lead to the vexed 
question of who will monitor the monitor. Since market competition from 
alternative monitors would not work because any incoming monitor would 
experience similar incentives for shirking, one solution would remain:  
                                                                                                                                                                          
2 It remains unclear whether he was simply relying on the enforceability of contracts in courts of 
law or also on internalised normative obligations. 
3 Note that efficiency only requires that rewards are correlated with (not necessarily equal to) 
the marginal value of input contributions. 
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inputs. If owners of inputs agree with the monitor that he is to receive any residual 
product above prescribed amounts (hopefully, the marginal value products of the other 
inputs), the monitor will have an added incentive not to shirk as a monitor”  (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972: 782, emphasis added). 
Although dependent on the strong assumption of the possibility of metering 
individual productivity and the corresponding alignment of rewards, we have 
here a solution to the IA-OG problem. The “owners of resources” have an 
incentive to cooperate – they are entitled to rewards which are in accord with 
productivity – the monitor, as a residual claimant, has also an incentive not to 
shirk as a monitor
4. The alignment of individual action and organizational goals 
acquires a hobbesian flavour – the surrender of autonomy, the dependence of 
“owners of resources” is justified on the grounds that rational and free 
individuals voluntary submit to monitoring for the sake of efficiency: 
“hence, team members who seek to increase their productivity will assign to the monitor 
not only the residual claimant right but also the right to alter individual membership and 
performance on the team. ... only the monitor may unilaterally terminate the 
membership of any of the other members.” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972:782). 
Alchian and Demsetz present the firm as a surrogate market. They deduce that 
conclusion with two steps. In the first, they state the employment relationship as 
a normal transaction of a commodity vs. money: 
“The firm (…) has no disciplinary power of fiat, no authority, no disciplinary action any 
different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting between any two 
people. I can “punish” you by withholding future business or by seeking redress in the 
courts for any failure to honor our exchange agreement. That is exactly what the 
employer can do.” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 777) 
In the second step they assign to firm the role of the: 
“the firm takes on the characteristics of an efficient market in that information about the 
characteristics of a large set of inputs in now more cheaply available.” (Alchian and 
Demsetz, 1972: 795) 
                                                           
4 A problem, however, may be raised. Besides having an incentive not to shirk as a monitor, the 
monitor, as a residual claimant has also an incentive to cut back on the “payments to other 
inputs”. He might tend to reward the "owners of inputs" not with the marginal value product but 
with a correlated inferior sum. Such an incentive might be checked by the possible exit of 
"resource owners". If however a positive cost of exit, for instance due to unemployment, is 
admitted the potential exists for a new social dilemma which could lead to a Pareto inferior 
equilibrium in the firm.  
  6The conclusion follows: “The firm can be considered a privately owned market”, 
and if so, “the firm and the ordinary market” are only “competing types of 
markets” (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972: 795). 
Nevertheless, a remarkable difference between the firm and the market 
remains. The monitor must not only meter productivity and align rewards. 
Before that he has to specify who does what and how, possibly in a way which 
can be cheaply observed and metered. While the authors state a clear incentive 
for effort after the tasks have been assigned, they fail to specify the incentive 
that drives the "owner of resourses" to accept task A, prescribed to her by the 
monitor, rather than B, which she would prefer. She must accept it since that is 
an obligation included in a freely celebrated contract. However such a contract 
is the employment contract, one which, as shown by Coase, is different from a 
simple transaction of commodities.  
The contention of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) that the power to manage is in 
no way different from the consumer's little power to "assign his grocer to various 
tasks" (Alchian and Demestz 1972: 777) is untenable. While the grocer can use 
the resources he owns as best suits him, the employee - such are the terms of 
the employment relationship - must use her's as best suits the monitor. The 
"owner of resources" must accept the instructions of the monitor, as the grocer 
must accept orders, but while the "owner of resources" has agreed to surrender 
control over the use of inputs she owns, the grocer has not. This amounts to a 
fundamental difference between the division of labor in the market and its 
counterpart in the firm. While the first is supposed to be driven by free choice of 
autonomous individuals, the second is led by the discretion of a monitor
5. 
Alchian's and Demsetz's solution to the IA-OG problem is thus unsatisfactory: 
team members cannot trust each other as suppliers of resources; they engage 
a monitor that sets up incentives to motivate performance on tasks which are 
imposed on them; incentives may account for effort once the tasks have been 
accepted; but the incentive to accept one task rather than another, in the first 
place, can only be the cost that the monitor can impose on them due to his 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
5 If the implications of that stark difference were taken along hayekian lines, the superiority of 
the firm over the market and the raison d'étre of the firm could hardly be asserted. This is 
probably why an Austrian theory of the firm has never been fully developed. 
  7special prerogatives. Those special prerogatives are a source of a power which 
is different from the power the consumer always has over a supplier, since it 
involves the control over the resources - in this case labor - owned by the 
supplier. The question remains how is it that "integration transforms a hostile 
supplier [a potential free-rider] into a docile employee" (Grossman and Hart, 
1986: 693, footnote 1)     
 
3. The alignment of individual actions with organizational goals in the 
economics theories of the firm 
 
The subsequent contributions to the theory of the firm built on Coase and 
Alchian and Demsetz’s seminal works, giving rise to three distinctive but tangled 
approaches: Transaction Cost, Agency and Property Rights Theories
6. Contrary 
to walrasian orthodoxy, these approaches assume that most contracting is 
unavoidably incomplete due to uncertainty and information asymmetries. 
Another central common feature is the main behavioural assumption of self-
interest seeking with allowance for guile: 
“Specifically, economic agents are permitted to disclose information in a selective and 
distorted manner. Calculated efforts to mislead, disguise, obfuscate and confuse are 
thus admitted. This self-interest seeking attribute is variously described as opportunism, 
moral hazard and agency” (Williamson, 1990:11-12).  
Both elements converge to enhance the IA-OG problem. 
 
Transaction Cost Theories 
Transaction Cost Theory shares with Coase a predominant focus on 
transactions costs and organizational issues. Bounded rationality, time, 
uncertainty, privately held information, opportunism and asset specificity
7, all 
elements introduced by Williamson and his followers in the theory, contribute to 
substantially enhance both ex ante and ex post (re)negotiation costs. 
                                                           
6 The analysis presented below tries to capture the prevailing features of each approach 
concerning the way in which the IA-OG issue is handled; it will thus not do justice to the most 
sophisticated contributions. 
  8Transaction cost theory then focus on the formal and informal institutional 
arrangements that may minimize these transaction costs as time passes. To 
make it simple, bounded rationality, uncertainty and asymmetries of information 
make it difficult to (ex ante) write complete contracts and opportunism and asset 
specificity make it difficult to ex post enforce previous agreements. The costs of 
constant negotiation and adaptation to contingencies may make it worthwhile to 
organize the transaction so that all the relevant assets are commanded by a 
single economic entity. 
Now, within the firm, the existence of firm-specific human assets (which can not 
legally be bought and sold), that is, the specific human capital of employees, 
leaves both the workers and the firm vulnerable to being held up: the firm may 
attempt to take advantage of the loss incurred by the worker if he leaves and 
the worker may threaten the firm to depart and take with him his valuable 
knowledge. How is this IA-OG dilemma – mainly raised by the adoption of 
opportunism as the relevant behavioural assumption - solved? 
Part of the solution comes from the acknowledgement of non-pecuniary 
individual motives. Fiat and the crafting of credible commitments through 
complex contracting and incentives, along with motives such as reciprocity, trust 
and reputation are put forward. Moreover, the exercise of fiat is one of the 
distinguishing features between firms and markets. As it is assumed that both 
firms and employees have interest in a long-term relationship, workers may 
voluntarily agree to carry out the employer’s commands as long as they are 
fairly treated by the firm; the firm has in turn no incentive to take advantage of 
workers as long as they satisfactorily perform. In this vein, it is in each party’s 
interest to build a good reputation, be trustworthy and cooperate. Formal 
models of bilateral reciprocity and multilateral trust-reputation construction have 
been developed
8 that show that cooperative equilibria are formally and 
rationally sustainable. It is to be noted that trust and reciprocity are conceived 
as a result of calculated (long-term) self-interest and as purely instrumental 
behavioural norms. If their non-economic character is acknowledged, their 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7 An asset is considered to be specific when its value depends on the continuation in time of a 
particular relationship, or, differently stated, when its value is smaller outside than within the 
relationship. 
  9moral dimension is never mentioned. Also, the potential for conflict embedded 
in employment relationships is hardly treated. 
May we conjecture that it is the very calculative and instrumental character of 
such norms that leads Williamson to be so sceptical?  
“The purported efficacy of reputation effects (…) is widely invoked to support efficient 
trade. But what are the limits? If fully efficacious, why do we not rely entirely on 
reputation effects to police trade across all technologically separable stages? And if 
reputation effects require support, why does it not suffice to invent a suitable collective-
action mechanism …? 
… Because the efficacy of a reputation effect varies with the nature of transactions and 
with the conditions of embeddedness (local sanctions and the like), this and other 
theories of spontaneous order often need to be augmented by providing transaction-
specific intentional order of an ex post governance kind” (Williamson, 2005:11). 
Hence, in the last resort, Transaction Cost Theory solves the IA-OG problem 
through a hierarchical mode of governance. Contracts are supposed to be 
enforced and authority made effective mainly by administrative control and by 
various sanctioning devices. But this leads back to Coase’s blind spot: Why do 
people comply with their commitments, why do people obey? 
 
Agency Theories 
Agency Theories recognize the limitations of hierarchies to assure alone 
obedience and, relying instead on the standard assumption according to which 
the apportioning of rewards in accord with productivity ensures efficiency, they 
leave aside organizational features and concentrate on incentive devices that 
may promote the alignment of the employees and the employers’ conflicting 
interests.  
Contrary to Alchian and Demsetz whose theorization begins with the analysis of 
team work, agency theories intend to generalize Alchian and Demsetz’s 
argument by assuming that the employment relationship is an incomplete 
contract at the outset – because the level and type of effort is not completely 
contractible -, even when there is no team work. This implies that the need for 
                                                                                                                                                                          
8 These models are developed within a very different strand of literature, related to game theory 
and only incidentally related to transaction cost theory. See Baron and Kreps, 1999, Apendix B, 
for a quick overview of the literature. 
  10some “contractual centralised agent” to monitor and command employees’ 
performance no longer exists. 
“We are sympathetic with the importance [Alchian and Demsetz] attach to monitoring, 
but we believe the emphasis that [they] place on joint production is too narrow and 
therefore misleading. Contractual relations are the essence of the firm, not only with 
employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors and so on. The problem of agency 
costs and monitoring exists for all of these contracts, independent of whether there is 
joint production in their sense; ie, joint production can explain only a small fraction of the 
behaviour of individuals associated with a firm. 
It is important to recognize that most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve 
as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals.” (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976:8). 
The firm is hence formally reducible to a nexus of bilateral agency relations, 
defined as contracts under which the principal hires the agent to perform 
services on his/her behalf and monitors him on a bilateral basis
9. Agency 
models thus concentrate on the problem of metering, monitoring and rewarding 
workers’ effort. As information is asymmetric and the optimal strategy of 
opportunistic agents does not optimize the utility function of the principal, a 
system of incentives has to be established to ensure that agents provide the 
expected level of effort. The benefits generated by the agency relationship must 
be higher than the agency costs. 
The former models posit that pecuniary compensation is the sole motivator and 
a multitude of models exist that propose sophisticated ways of tying 
compensation levels to absolute or comparative performance measures. If 
agency relations are of a contractual nature and do not differ from other market 
relations, monetary signals alone are supposed to regulate employee/employer 
relations. Authority is eliminated as a variable of interest in the theory of the firm 
and substituted by autonomous parties contracting; markets are now 
everywhere. 
                                                           
9 If the first agency models pictured firms as generalized one principal-many agents structures, 
more recent models picture them as web of contracts. Employees have then implicit or explicit 
contractual relationships with the stockholders but also with their supervisor, their subordinates 
and some of their co-workers. All these contracts interrelate through incentive considerations. 
“A complete analysis of this phenomenon requires the development of a concept of ‘general 
equilibrium in contracts’, that is of a set of contracts such that no pair of contracting parties has 
any incentives to resign their contract” (Cremer, 1990:54-55). Thus, the equilibrium theoretical 
frame is the same for the firm and for the market. 
  11However, as recognized by the prominent authors
10 of the theory, the design of 
incentive-compatible devices does not empirically nor theoretically eliminate the 
issue of the enforcement of irreducibly incomplete contract, that is, the IA-OG 
issue. More recent models begin to integrate “non-economic” motives such as 
intrinsic motivations, power, the ability to remain employed, co-workers’ esteem 
or justice concerns to turn the argument more realistic. Again, no mention is 
made to the (in)commensurability of these motives with pecuniary ones. 
Only when it comes to analyse group incentive schemes is the collective action 
nature of organizational life acknowledged. The free-riding problem and the 
associated threat of underperformance are then explicitly stated in a collective 
and productive setting and the usual dyadic and transactional frame is dropped 
down. Peer pressure, multilateral monitoring, reputation and the internalization 
of the welfare of the group (Baron and Kreps, 1999) are then called for to 
overcome the IA-OG problem. 
In respect to the internal consistence of these theories: two points are worth 
mentioning: 1) the firm as a whole is a set of contractual relations where 
employees are “contractors”, while workgroups or teams are of a collective 
nature and employees become “team-members”; 2) while at the outset 
opportunism is assumed, when groups are evoked, other-regarding and “non-
economic” motives are largely relied upon.  
 
The New Property Rights’ approach of firms 
This approach advances a different solution to solve the now well-defined and 
ill-resolved problems of contractual theories: What are the benefits of organising 
the transactions within the firm? How to handle the difficulties that arise from the 
writing or enforcing incomplete contracts? How is the IA-OG solved? 
Alchian and Demsetz “residual claimant” idea is here developed and the firm is 
defined as being composed of the assets that it owns or over which it has 
control (Grossman and Hart, 1986). Ownership is defined as the power to 
exercise control. Control rights are purchased (that is, firms come into 
existence) because they confer residual rights of control, that is, the right to 
                                                           
10 See Gibbons (1998) and Prendergast (1999) for a review of the literature. Baron and Kreps 
(1999:279) summarize pay-for-performance shortcomings in five points: “they misalign 
incentives, they put too much risk on employees, they have legitimacy problems, they are 
inflexible and they can kill intrinsic motivations”.  
  12control all aspects that are not ex ante specified or contractible (in particular, it 
is impossible to ex ante contractually specify a clear division of the surplus to be 
generated). The control of several assets by a single ownership unit may be 
more efficient than separate ownership depending on the relative costs and 
benefits of such control. The central focus of the theory is to study the optimal 
assignment of assets. 
 
In the seminal papers, employees are not substantively distinguished from 
outside independent contractors (Grossman and Hart, 1986:694,717). The 
specificity of the employment relationship is that the employer purchases the 
residual rights of control over employees’ actions (instead of assets). Authority 
rights are but one type of property rights. Employees have the obligation to 
obey as they have contracted with the productive assets owners that the latter 
have the right to specify and decide what actions they have to undergo. Such a 
contract is assumed to be enforceable because of competition between 
employees
11: “since there are many subordinates, none is in a position to refuse 
to carry out the owners’ wishes or to argue about terms” (Grossman and Hart, 
1986:699). Therefore, no special governance skills are required from managers 
to command the productive activity of employees.  
“An important idea underlying the analysis is that a key right provided by ownership is 
the ability to exclude people from the use of assets. We have argued that this authority 
over assets translates into authority over people: an employee will tend to act in the 
interest of his boss. Although we have emphasized the role of tangible assets such as 
machines, location, or clients lists, we suspect that the ideas may generalize to 
intangible assets such as goodwill. Some nonhuman assets are essential for the 
argument, however, and in fact we suspect that they are an important ingredient of any 
theory of the firm. The reason is that in the absence of any nonhuman assets, it is 
unclear what authority menas. Authority over what? Control over what? Surely 
integration does not give a boss direct control over workers’ human capital, in the 
absence of slavery” (Hart and Moore, 1990: 1150).  
New Property Rights Theory follows Alchian and Demsetz in not distinguishing 
the employment relationship from any other mercantile contract (in both cases 
the sanctions are the same: exit of the relationship that can take the particular 
  13form of firing) but it captures Coase’s insight by assuming that one agent is 
more likely to do what another agent wants if they are in an employment 
relationship. 
As explicitly recognised by the authors, ownership rights “shifts the incentives 
for opportunistic and distortionary behaviour, but [they] do not remove these 
incentives” (Grossman and Hart, 1986:716). Command is clearly the solution 
advanced for the social dilemma within the firm: obedience is granted because 
the “future livelihood [of employees] depends on [the owners of productive 
assets]” (Hart and More, 1990:1150). 
 
3. Knowledge-based theories and IA-OG problem 
 
In a very different strand of literature, the last two decades have witnessed the 
development of knowledge-based theories of the firm. Nelson and Winter 
(1982), in their theorization of an evolutionary theory provided one of the 
seminal works to this approach. The original problem posed to the firm is how 
individual members can learn how to contribute to firms’ organizational 
capabilities which transcend their individual capacities. Refusing to assume 
uniformity in technology these theories have as the central “raison d’être” of the 
firm the mobilization and creation of idiosyncratic knowledge from which it builds 
its comparative advantages. Firms, even in the same industry, become very 
different in the way they learn and produce. Hence, the population of firms is 
heterogeneous, even when firms do or produce the same things, opening the 
path for the existence of a selection mechanism within the competitive market. 
Based on a substantively different notion of knowledge, the firm is defined as 
“knowledge processor” (Cohendet and Llerena, 1998), a “knowledge creating 
entity” (Nonaka et al., 2000), or a “social community specialized in the 
transference and creation of knowledge” (Kogut and Zander, 1997). 
The notion of knowledge is very distinct from the one prevailing in the 
neoclassical paradigm. The theories of the firm reviewed above all rely on 
                                                                                                                                                                          
11 It is to be noted that what is explicitly assumed here is the existence of involuntary 
unemployment while the existence of full employment is the required condition for the internal 
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existence of the firm. Yet it is significant that knowledge is here always seen as 
information. The difference with knowledge-based theories is not only syntactic 
but clearly semantic. Information in mainstream theories is understood as 
codified knowledge which - although with particular problems – is transmissible 
and transactionable. As Coase (1937) puts it: “We can imagine a system where 
all advice or knowledge was bought as required”. 
To fully understand the notion of knowledge present in resource-based theories 
we have to go back of Michael Polanyi (1967). In his struggle against scientism 
he argued that knowledge is composed of two epistemologically distinct but 
closely tangled dimensions. The codified dimension of knowledge is the one 
expressed in some sort of language which, therefore, and most importantly, can 
be physically stored. The tacit, non-articulated, almost unconscious, dimension 
of knowledge is brilliantly described by Polanyi’s aphorism: “we know more than 
we can tell”. Tacit knowledge results from learning processes that cannot be 
pulled out from the individuals and their social context. It often consists of habits 
that agent himself may not recognize.  
Polanyi’s distinction was initially conceived having in mind the individual. Nelson 
and Winter (1982) reconceptualised it by adding to the epistemological 
tacit/codified difference an ontological individual/collective distinction. For them 
the firm is a repository of collective knowledge: 
“What is central to a productive organizational performance is coordination; what is 
central to coordination is that individual members, knowing their jobs, correctly interpret 
and respond to messages they receive. The interpretations that members give to the 
messages are the mechanism that picks out, from a vast array of possibilities consistent 
with the roster of member repertoires a collection of individual members’ performances 
that actually constitute a productive performance for the organizational as a whole.” 
(Nelson and Winter, pp ….) 
The presence of boundedly rational members (Simon, 1957) with their tacit 
knowledge raises the need for procedural rules to coordinate the contribution of 
individual knowledge. There is then a development of collective operational 
knowledge within firms which function as “repositories of knowledge” (Winter, 
1988). For Nelson and Winter this knowledge is embodied in routines, defined 
                                                                                                                                                                          
consistency of Alchian and Demsetz thesis, as argued above. 
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and production processes. Given the predictability of routines, radical 
uncertainty is reduced and replication of (tacit and codified) knowledge provided 
(Becker, 2004). Routines are the organizational repositories of the firms’ 
capabilities providing an “(…) individuality to the firm that is partly independent 
from the human factor.” (Cohendet and Llerena, 1998). Routines have then both 
governance and cognitive meaning, they are an “organizational memory”. 
Knowledge is then conceived as a social process which can transcend the mere 
aggregation of individual knowledge.  
It is then argued that, at least, particular forms of knowledge can only be 
developed within a structured organization which is the sole able to provide the 
procedures and social norms that frame the interaction of boundedly rational 
agents. Knowledge is highly dynamic, situated in time (which implies path-
dependency) and in space (which implies a local character). Knowledge 
generation is an historical process of interaction between the individuals and 
their environment (markets, public institutions); any knowledge producing 
process thus presents an idiosyncratic dimension (Witt, 2001). 
The acknowledgement of the collective character of knowledge in the firm is a 
major advancement credited to Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary approach and 
subsequent knowledge-based theories. The firm cannot be taken only as loci of 
coordination but also and more importantly as loci of creation, implementation 
and diffusion of productive knowledge (Dosi and Marengo, 2000).  
In evolutionary theory little attention was initially given to the role of individual 
agency inside the firm. The major concern within these theories was to provide 
a theoretical framework justifying firm heterogeneity in markets and not a theory 
of the firm or of agency. Problems at this level were to be solved by a ubiquitous 
concept of routines. They would act as truces inside the firm since they embody 
rules and codes shared by the firm members, thus granting predictability and 
coherence to group practices. On the other hand, they would increase the 
possibility of control since there is a standardization of practices and 
comparison is made easier (Becker, 2004). However, the adherence to the 
rules by the individual was taken as automatic. Nothing was said on how and 
why are people willing to collaborate in organizations, mainly by default, 
  16perhaps it was assumed that members are “benevolent co-operators” (Dosi and 
Marengo, 2000). 
More recent knowledge-based theories of the firm (Conner et. Prahalad (1996), 
Kogut and Zander (1996), Nonaka et al. (2000), Dosi and Marengo, 2000, 
Cohendet and Llerena, 1998), when focusing on the transfer individual  tacit 
knowledge, do acknowledge the importance of the IA-OG problem and try to 
develop some kind of complementarity with Transaction Costs Economics 
(Cohendet and LLerena, 1998; Dosi and Marengo, 2000, Conner and Prahalad 
(1996)). Others like Nonaka et al. (2000) advanced a multi-motivational notion 
of the individual to account for the disposition of individuals to disclose and 
share tacit knowledge. Monetary compensation but also intrinsic motivations – 
such as self-satisfaction, peer recognition, sense of belonging – are the 
mechanisms put forward to account for the collaborative behaviour of 
individuals. Nonetheless, nothing is said on how these multiple motivation 
factors are collectively triggered inside the firm.  
Kogut and Zander (1996) single out identity as crucial in promoting more 
efficient learning. Firms as social communities, where the division of labour 
promotes communication and coordination, provide a sense of belonging. In 
spite of those recent contributions, overall, the knowledge-based theories of the 
firm still lack a satisfactory solution for the IA-OG, an issue that becomes even 
more salient once the tacit knowledge in the firm is recognized. 
 
4. Principles of order and accounts of the firm 
Separation and command are the principles under which different “solutions” to 
the problem of social order have been advanced in mainstream economics. 
Although differing in every other respect, those principles hold in common the 
behavioral assumptions of self-interest and opportunism. In theories of the firm 
separation and command are implicit whenever an answer to the IA-OG 
problem is called for.  
Separation as a solution to the problem of social order is best illustrated by 
Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees, according to which individuals, or rather, bees, 
who mind their own business and only interact as merchants, successfully 
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underlying mainstream accounts of the economy. Mainstream economics has 
indeed devoted the best of its efforts to prove that order could emerge of the 
separate free choices of individuals. Since that principle clearly seems fitter to 
describe markets, hardly could one expect to reencounter it in respect to firms. 
However, in Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and in every description of the firm as 
a nexus of contracts as agency or property rights theory, the firm is described 
as a set of separate individuals interacting in a market-like way.  
Separation as a principle of social order collapses whenever the trivial fact is 
acknowledged that the consequences of individual actions may fall not only on 
the acting agent but also on others. In that case, separation (the market) fails 
and some other (artificial) principle of order has to be called for in order to avoid 
the collapse of order, be it under the form of generalized free-riding or "the war 
of all against all".  
This artificial principle may stem out of a social contract as is the case with 
Hobbes' Leviathan or Alchian's and Demsetz's Monitor. And, as long as such an 
entity is seen as limiting itself to insure that rewards are distributed as if 
individuals were separated, the resulting order may be conceived as a 
surrogate separation. However, the creation of the Leviathan does put an end to 
separation. Its very existence implies that individuals are surrendering at least 
part of their autonomy, while under separation, or the market, they are 
supposed to uphold theirs, using the resources owned by them in the way which 
best suits their purposes. Command is the principle of order called for when 
separation breaks down.  
Command comes in different forms: as the outcome of a contract, as described 
above, or as the outcome of a power differential. When it comes under the first 
form the surrender of autonomy appears as a free choice of an individual. When 
it comes in the second form, it is coercion. The employment relationship which 
is at the core of the capitalist firm can be conceived under one or the other 
perspective.  But it can also be conceived under both: since in the labor contract 
entry and exit are guaranteed, there is freedom; but to the extent that this 
freedom may depend on the general conditions of society, it may be more or 
less constrained. Also depending on the general conditions of society the 
  18constraints imposed on the freedom of the parties may be asymmetrical. It 
makes sense to relate the asymmetric assignment of rights and duties between 
employers and employees to this power asymmetry. But the possibility of 
someone preferring one position even when she could choose the other exists, 
and must be considered.
12  
In all new institutionalist theories of the firm the bottom line is command - a 
principal that breaks down when it is understood that its efficacy depends on 
obedience. What makes people obey? Transaction cost and new property rights 
assume obedience at the outset as the counterpart of command. The criticisms 
addressed to those theories stress that obedience is thus left unexplained. This 
may be right. But in also assuming that incentives are the only explanation for 
obedience, the critics may be wrong, and transaction cost theorists closer to 
truth. There are indeed other explanations for obedience, but these where left 
unexplored in both strands. Obedience will have to be, one way or the other, 
based either on coercion or consent. If coercion is left aside as an extreme 
case, and consent remains, the fact arises that there must be always in consent 
an element of trust. But since trust is a good that can neither be secured by 
coercion nor contract (Arrow, 1974: 23), this is where command breaks down, 
calling for the assistance of a third principle of order. That principle, until 
recently excluded or minimized in economics, is association. 
Association is voluntary action of individuals towards a common goal. To 
associate is always to engage in mutual trust relations. But association, as 
command, comes in different flavors. There is an ancient, customary, form of 
association - a passive and uncritical conformity with social norms, conventions 
and routines. But there is also a modern rational form, which presupposes a 
shared vision or interest, and a capacity of individuals to commit themselves, 
and act in concert for the realization of the common goals
13. Association, 
however, can also be conceived under both forms, old and new, by 
                                                           
12 Commons even considered that: "Labour, as such, is made up of young labourers and new 
labourers continually coming in, without experience or discipline. It is even immoral to hold to 
this miscellaneous labour, as a class, the hope that it can even manage industry. (...) What we 
find that labour wants, as a class, is wages, hours, and security, without financial responsibility, 
but with power enough to command respect." (Commons, 192: 284)     
13 Different explanations have been put forward for this capacity of commitment, ranging from 
moral sentiments, to social identity and collective intentions (ref.).  
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sense that it presupposes authority and set of robust shared rules.. Authority, 
though, should not be assimilated to command in the sense that it excludes 
coercion and presupposes consent. Barnard captures well the double meaning 
of authority when he writes that, 
“(…) authority involves two aspects: first, the subjective, the personal, the accepting of a 
communication as authoritative; and, second, the objective aspect (…) the “system of 
coordination”" (Barnard, 1938:163, authors’ italics).  
While the first form of association is usually referred to in the past, it sometimes 
reemerges in structuralist or functionalist explanations of conformity with social 
rules. The knowledge based theories of the firm while focused on routines, 
might, although unintendedly, be instances of those approaches. In economics 
the second form of association is either taken as infeasible (Olson, 1967) or 
postponed to an uncertain future, as in Stuart Mill or Marshall (Caldas et al., 
2006).  
Whatever the form, association has been a footnote in the theories of the firm. 
In fact Alchian and Demsetz (1972) briefly refer “team spirit and loyalty” as a 
mechanism for enhancing team efficiency, and Coase and Williamson 
acknowledge the importance of trust in different passages. Recently however a 
shift in perspective is under way, and attempts to incorporate trust in economics 
are numerous either in or outside the frame of the traditional ontology of 
individuals
14.  
As the former principles, association is vulnerable. The condition for its 
robustness would be a capacity for commitment without limits - a moral 
imperative of some sort. But since such a capacity is admittedly too demanding, 
commitment tends to be conceived as bounded by the weakness of the will, and 
conditional on the behavior of others, giving rise to a behavioral pattern that is 
usually described as reciprocity. The implication is that commitment and trust, 
as obedience, cannot be taken for granted. Though association may be 
possible, given the capacity for commitment, that possibility depends on the 
                                                           
14 Akerlof and Kranton (2005), in a recent but influential paper on (social) identity assert that: 
“inculcating in employees a sense of identity and attachment to an organization is critical to 
well-functioning enterprises” (Akerlof and Kranton, 2005: 10). 
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size and cohesiveness.    
Taken in isolation no single principle may thus account for order
15: separation 
breaks down on external effects, calling for command; command breaks down 
on obedience; calling for association, association breaks down on free-riding, 
due to the weakness of the will. Any order involves a combination of three 
principles. The element of associations necessarily contained in every order 
presupposes the moral capacity. The bottom line is thus morality: it is indeed 
morality that may explain the commitment and trust needed for consent, as it is 
consent that may account for the effectiveness of the command
16. 
Understandings of the firm that draw on impurity, that is, complementarity 
among principles of order, and morality have since long been available. The 
most remarkable contributions are those of John Commons (1934) and Chester 
Barnard (1938). Commons view of the corporation as a “going concern” and a 
set of working rules enforced by morals, law and economic gain and loss, as 
collective action in control and expansion of individual action, largely precedes 
and goes beyond much of what is currently being written on the firm. The same 
could be stated in relation to Chester Barnard’s conception of organizations as 
“systems of cooperative services of individuals” rather than mere networks of 
contractual relations, and of his view of the executive’s function as an instance 
of “moral creativeness”. Although the New Institutional Economics tradition 
sometimes claims the influence of those predecessors, their reluctance in 
respect to morality as an appropriate subject of scientific inquiry, has crowded 
out the most interesting intuitions in those classical contributions. 
 
6. The pure principles and knowledge  
The reason why creativity and knowledge are a challenge to the received 
theories of the firm is clearly suggested by Alchian and Demsetz (1972: 786):  
                                                           
15 To a certain extent all theories of the firm, explicitly or implicitly, involve more that one 
principle.  
16 The source of morality is obviously an open question. When and if a rational choice account 
will be given for morality, an explanation for order among separate individuals will be available. 
Until then we are entitled to take it as a capacity of individuals on the same ground as self-love.  
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team member is difficult to correlate with his behavior. In “artistic” or “professional” 
work, watching a man’s activities is not a good clue to what he is actually thinking or 
doing with his mind.(...) As a result, artistic or professional inputs, such as lawyers, 
advertising specialists, and doctors, will be given relatively freer reign with regard to 
individual behavior [... and, in those cases ...] there will develop a tendency to use 
profit-sharing schemes to provide incentives to avoid shirking”  
In respect to all tasks involving creativity and complex knowledge metering is far 
more difficult – observation is unable to correlate behavior and productivity. 
Further more as noted by Brousseau (1998: 460) “the unit that benefits from a 
transfers [of knowledge] can be conducive to the creation of new knowledge, 
that will increase the value of the initial knowledge” - no external observer of 
such a process could ever measure those synergetic effects. The difficulty in 
metering poses a new challenge to monitoring. However, in knowledge based 
firm the problem with monitoring is not only its feasibility but its desirability. In 
respect to all tasks involving creativity and complex knowledge, assigning tasks 
to individuals and assigning individuals to teams would be even harder than 
correlating productivity with behavior. If work within the organization can be 
reduced to simple and homogeneous atoms, as in the taylorist factory, the 
process of assigning individuals to tasks and teams, as the process of 
observation and metering, are probably easy and cheap. If however the work is 
complex, involving noncodifiable and idiosyncratic knowledge serious mistakes 
can be made. 
Those are difficulties for command, not separation. Attention should at this point 
be paid to Hayek (1945) according to whom separation would be the most 
efficient principle in fostering knowledge in society. In fact, Hayek is convincing 
when he compares a society of separate individuals left free to exploit and 
explore their knowledge as they seem fit, with another where individuals are 
assigned to tasks by someone who is unaware of their true potential. He is also 
convincing when he states that metering performance would demand a 
codification of all procedures that would preclude creativity. 
However markets also have their limits in respect to creativity and knowledge: 
(a) the exchange of knowledge in markets, as in firms, would require, for the 
sake of cheap contracting, the same codification; (b) creativity requires an 
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firm. As stressed in knowledge-based theories of the firm, and as mentioned 
above, particular forms of knowledge can only be developed within a structured 
organisation. However, the key structural element here involved is sustained 
cooperation, not command. The disclosure and sharing of knowledge implies 
that individuals are committed to the goals of the organization willing to 
collaborate with each other. This means that a crucial precondition for 
knowledge sharing is trust.  
The importance of trust and cooperation brings forth association as a foundation 
for knowledge sharing. However, association, as noted in Bowles' (2004) 
discussion on community, has its own problems: besides being sustainable only 
for comparatively small groups, it induces a preference for interactions with 
insiders that may preclude inter-group exchange and foster segregation, and it 
generates a homogeneity that precludes the variety that may be critical in 
respect to creativity.   
The above reasoning clearly suggests that the impurity needed for creativity 
and knowledge sharing should be a combination of the best in separation 
(autonomous exploration and exploitation of knowledge) with the best in 
association (shared vision, commitment and trust). At first sight this seems to be 
impossible to achieve in any form of economic organisation. We briefly 
hypothesise in concluding that it might not be so.  
    
7. Conclusion 
We started from an analysis of the most influential theories of the firm which 
highlights their main deficiency: the insufficiency of their solution to the IA-IO 
problem. Next we related those theories to underlying principles of order in 
economics - an exercise that allowed us to see that the deficiency of the 
theories is related to the underrating of association and of the association-
related moral capabilities of individuals.  
We next considered the challenges posed by knowledge to the new 
institutionalist theories and we conjectured that the type of impurity that is called 
for in respect to creativity and knowledge sharing must to be a combination of 
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conceive.     
However, accounts of "peer production"
17 as a new mode of production in the 
digitally networked environment that is neither market nor firm based, having 
elements of both (Benkler, 2002), suggest that the above combination of 
features may be feasible under some conditions. 
The starting point of a rationale for this new mode of production would drive us 
back to the alternative division of labor in the market or in the pin factory. The 
basic question in both cases is what each individual should do and with whom. 
While in the market the solution to that problem is the object of search of the 
individual guided by relative prices and other signals, in the pin factory it is the 
outcome of a management decision. The correctness of those decisions is 
dependent on the correctness of the signals that guide the search process, that 
is, it depends on weather the signals disclose the true value of the input and of 
the combination of inputs. A condition for evaluating the correspondence 
between signal and true value is the specification of the input, otherwise both 
contract and managerial decisions would be ill founded. As noted by Benkler 
(2002: 7), "where agents, effort, or resources cannot be so specified, they 
cannot be accurately priced or managed".  
In peer production decisions about what each individual should do and with 
whom, are taken, as in the market, by those “who have the best information 
about their own fit” (Blenker, 2002: 8). Provided there is a system to filter out 
wrong self-evaluations, like peer review, this may be a strong advantage in 
respect to the “pin factory”. 
Contrary to the market though, those decisions are not driven by price signals 
since the whole system is based on gift exchange. Consequently, the 
asymmetry of information and the incompleteness contracts due the 
impossibility of specifying inputs is irrelevant in this context. This in turn, 
represents an advantage in respect to markets. The principle of gift exchange 
brings forth association in respect to peer production, with its element authority 
in goal setting and peer review.  
                                                           
17 For instance: free software, academic production, open encyclopaedia (wikipeadia), collective blogs. 
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community. It is an association of separate individuals, who come and go, as 
they will, although requiring a shared set of working rules and the corresponding 
authority.  
However the possibility of peer production is constrained by at least two main 
factors: (a) cheap and disseminated capital goods; (b) productive processes 
liable to decomposition in small modules.  Among many open questions one 
has been intriguing economists: what, if is there is no alignment of productivity 
and reward, drives the agents to contribute? 
Overall the fact of peer production, in the frame of the above analysis, suggests 
that when creativity and knowledge is the issue the well identified forms of 
economic organization - the market and the firm - are not the only alternatives 
to consider. 
However, peer product might just be a limit in a continuum of mixed knowledge 
intensive organizational forms which have in common a tendency for the 
relaxing of command. Such mixed organizational forms might also be the firms 
described by Witt, which    
“(…) leave room for initiative and creative situational problem-solving in the employee’s 
decision making, [mobilizing business conceptions that] must be fairly global, less 
detailed, and less specific devices.” (Witt, 1998: 173) 
The best concluding conjecture so far is that, in order to mobilize the knowledge 
and creativity of its members the firm would have to evolve to the point of 
transforming its very nature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  25 
References 
 
AKERLOF, George (1982): “Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 92, nº4. 
AKERLOF, George, R. KRANTON (2005): “Identity and the Economics of 
Organizations”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 19, nº 1 
ALCHIAN, Armen, H. DEMSETZ (1972): “Production, Information Costs and 
Economic Organization”, American Economic Review, vol. 62, nº5. 
AMIN, Ash and P. COHENDET (2004): Architectures of Knowledge, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
AOKI, Masahiko, B. GUSTAFSSON and O. WILLIAMSON (ed.) (1990): The 
Firm as a Nexus of Treaties, SAGE Publications, London 
AOKI, Masahoki (1990): “The Participatory Generation of Information Rents and 
the Theory of the Firm”, in AOKI, GUSTAFSSON and WILLIAMSON (ed.) 
ARROW, Kenneth (1974): The Limits of Organization, W. W. Norton & 
Company, New York. 
BARNARD, Chester (1938): The Functions of the Executive, Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press. 
BARON, James, D. KREPS (1999): Strategic Human Resources; Jon Wiley and 
Sons 
BAUDRY, Bernard (2003): Économie de la firme, Paris, Repères, La 
Découverte. 
BECKER, Markus (2004): Organizational routines: A review of the literature. 
Industrial and Corporate Change. Vol. 13, No. 4, 643-678. 
BENKLER, Yochai (2002), "Coases's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the 
Firm", Yale Law Journal, Vol. 4, No. 3. 
BESSY, C., and E. BROUSSEAU (1998). “Techonological Licensing Contracts: 
Features and Diversity”, International Review of Law and Economics, 18, 
(Dec.), 451-89. 
BOWLES, Samuel (2004), Microeconomics – Behavior, Institutions, and 
Evolution, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
CALDAS, José C., J. RODRIGUES, L. CARVALHO (2003): Economics and 
Social Psychology on Public Goods: Experiments and Explorations, Notas 
Económicas, 18. 
CALDAS, José C., A. COSTA and T. BURNS, Rethinking Economics – The 
Potential Contribution of the Classics, forthcoming Cambridge Journal of 
Economics.  
CAMERER Colin, E. FEHR (2002): Measuring Social Norms and Preferences 
using Experimental Games, WP nº 97, IERE, University of Zurich. 
  26COASE, Ronald (1937), "The nature of the firm", Economica N. S., 4, pp. 386-
405. 
COHENDET P., P. LLERENA (1998). “Theory of the firm in an Evolutionary 
perspective: A critical development”. Paper to conference “Competence, 
governance and Entrepreneurship” Copenhagen, 1998 
COMMONS, John (1921), "Industrial Governement", originally in International 
Labour Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, reprinted in International Labour Review, Vol. 
135, No. 3-4, 1996, pp. 281-286. 
COMMONS, John (1934), Institutional Economics - Its Place in Political 
Economy, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003. 
CONNER, K, PRAHALAD, C. K. (1996). “A resource-based theory of the firm: 
Knowledge versus opportunism.” Organization Science, 7 (5): 477-501. 
CREMER Jacques (1990): “Common Knowledge and the Co-ordination of 
Economic Activities”, in AOKI, GUSTAFSSON and WILLIAMSON (ed.) 
DOSI Giovanni, L. MARENGO (2000): “On the Tangled Discourse between 
Transaction Cost Economics and Competence-Based Views of the Firm: some 
comments”, in FOSS N. and MAHNKE U. (ed.): Competence, Governance and 
Entrepreneurship, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
FALK Armin, E. FEHR and U. FISHBACHER (1999): On the Nature of Fair 
Behaviour, Working-Paper nº 17, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, 
University of Zurich. 
FREY Bruno (1997): Not Just for the Money, Aldershot, Edward Elgar. 
GARROUSTE, Pierre and S. SAUSSIER (2005), "Looking for a theory of the 
firm: Future chalenges", Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 58, 
pp. 178-199. 
GAUTIÉ, Jérôme (2003): Quelle troisième voie? Repenser l’articulation entre 
marché du travail et protection social?, Document de travail nº 30, Centre 
d’Études de l’Emploi. 
GIBBONS, Robert (1998): “Incentives in Organizations”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 12, nº 4. 
GOSHAL, Sumantra, P. MORAN (1996): “Bad for Practice: A Critique of the 
Transaction Cost Theory”, Academy of the Management Journal, vol. 21, nº1. 
GROSSMAN, Sanford and O. HART (1986), "The Costs and benefits of 
Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration", Journal of Political 
Economy, Vol. 94, No. 4, pp. 691-719. 
HART, Oliver, J. MORE (1990): “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm”, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 98, nº 6. 
HAYEK, Friedrich (1960), The Constitution of Society, London: Routldge 
HAYEK, Friedrich (1945), "The use of Knowledge in Society", American 
Economic Review, 35, pp. 519-30.   
JAMES, Harvey (2002): “The trust paradox: a survey of economic inquiry into 
the nature of trust and trustworthiness”, Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organization, nº 47. 
  27KAHAN, Dan (2003): “The Logic of Reciprocity, Trust, Collective Action and 
Law, in BOYD, Robert, FEHR, Ernst, GINTIS, Herbert (forthcoming): The Moral 
Sentiments: Origins, Evidence and Consequences, Cambridge, MIT Press. 
KOGUT, B. and U. ZANDER (1996). “What Firms Do? Coordination, Identity, 
and Learning”, Organization Science, Vol 7, nº 5. 
LAZARIC, Nathalie,  P.-A. MANGOLTE, M-L. MASSUE (2003). "Articulation and 
codification of collective know-how in the steel industry: evidence from blast 
furnace control in France," Research Policy, vol. 32(10). 
LEDYARD John O (1995): Public Goods: a Survey of Experimental research, in 
KRAGEL, John, ROTH, Alvin (eds): The Handbook of Experimental Economics, 
Princeton University Press. 
LOPES, Helena and J. RODRIGUES (2004): “For Parsimony: Economics and 
the Excessive Reliance on Monetary Incentives”, mimeo   
LOPES Helena, J. C. CALDAS, J. RODRIGUES, COSTA Ana (2005): 
“Collective Action and Justice”, mimeo.  
NELSON, Richard and S. WINTER (1982): An Evolutionary Theory of the Firm,  
NONAKA, I., TOYAMA, R., NAGATA, A. (2000). “A Firm as Knowledge-creating 
Entity: A New Perspective on the Theory of the Firm”, Industrial and Corporate 
Change, vol. 9, 1-20. 
OLSON, Mancur (1971). The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University 
Press. 
OSTERLOH, Margit and B. FREY (2003): “Corporate Governance for Crooks? 
The case for Corporate Virtue”, Working-Paper nº 164, Institute for Empirical 
Research in Economics, University of Zurich 
OSTERLOH, Margit, J. FROST, B. FREY (2002): “The Dynamics of Motivation 
in New Organizational Forms”, International Journal of the Economics of 
Business, Vol.9, nº 1 
POLANYI, Michael (1962), Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical 
Philosophy, New York: Harper & Row. 
PRENDERGAST, Canice (1999): “The Provision of Incentives in Firms”, Journal 
of Economic Literature,  
SAYER, Andrew (2000): Markets, Embeddedness and Trust: Problems of 
Polysemy and Idealism, Department of Sociology, Lancaster University. 
SIMON, Herbert (1991): “Organizations and Markets”, Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol.5, nº2 
WILLIAMSON, Oliver (1975): Markets and Hierarchies, New York, Free Press 
WILLIAMSON, Oliver (1990): “The Firm as a Nexus of Treaties”, in AOKI, 
GUSTAFSSON and WILLIAMSON (ed.) 
WILLIAMSON, Oliver (2005): “The Economics of Governance”, AEA Papers 
and Proceedings, May 2005, vol. 95, nº 2. 
  28WITT, Ulrich (1998). "Imagination and leadership - The neglected dimension of 
an evolutionary theory of the firm," Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 161-177. 
 
  29